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1. Introduction 
Disaster prevention and management involves both technical and social dimensions, implying 
that research inputs from both sides may provide important contributions. This chapter presents 
an attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of how Swedish response organisations 
managed the leadership challenges that they encountered during the rescue operation following 
the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia. Informants from three Swedish authorities, some at strategic 
level in Sweden and some at field level in Thailand, were interviewed while the rescue operation 
was still going on. Our text consequently examines their interaction and deals with the soft side 
of disaster management from a social science perspective. 
The tsunami of 26 December 2004 had momentous consequences for large parts of Southeast 
Asia – from personal tragedies to far-reaching consequences for countries’ economies and 
populations. In addition to Southeast Asia, the tsunami also affected many countries far from 
its epicentre. A recent analysis by the United Nations lists almost 250,000 dead people 
(http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/en/). Of the European countries, 
Sweden suffered the greatest number of casualties in the tsunami. Some 20,000 Swedes were 
on holiday in Thailand when the tsunami struck. According to a Swedish Governmental 
Official Report (SOU, 2005:104), it could be confirmed in 2005 that 543 Swedes died and 18 are 
still missing (Alvinius, Danielsson & Larsson, 2010a; Alvinius, Danielsson & Larsson, 2010b).  
2. Our study – method  
2.1. Selection of informants 
Following the guidelines of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the selection of 
participants was guided by a desire to find informants with a wide variety of experiences 
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and occupational roles during the rescue operation. The organisations involved in this 
study are the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Swedish Armed Forces and the 
National Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden. Data were collected by interviews, 
following a prepared interview guide. During the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, the 
task of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency was to lead and coordinate the operational 
work, i.e. the emergency team which was sent to Southeast Asia, and to manage logistics 
and home transportation of Swedish tourists who had suffered great losses in terms of both 
health and belongings. In accordance with Swedish law, the Swedish Armed Forces 
contributed personnel, equipment and transport to support organisations such as the 
Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Swedish National Police Board and the Swedish Civil 
Aviation Administration. In this supporting role was the Swedish Armed Forces Operative 
Unit, which supervises missions in Sweden and abroad on a daily basis. The National 
Board of Health and Welfare was also involved during the rescue operation in Thailand, its 
task being to work with emergency management within the healthcare system, for 
example, with the prevention of infectious diseases, social services, provision of 
information and allocation of government grants to the county councils, home transport of 
injured Swedish tourists and provision of medical care in the field (Alvinius, Danielsson & 
Larsson, 2010a).  
 
Organisation Number of 
informants 
Female/
Male 
Their position (during the rescue operation) 
1. The Swedish 
Rescue Services 
Agency 5 1/4 
 Director-general 
 Head of Operational Management  
 An emergency service function called 
Focal Point  
 Two Crisis Managers  
2. Swedish 
Armed Forces 
6 0/6 
 Logistics Coordinator  
 Medical Doctor on Duty  
 Liaison Officer sent from Operative Unit 
(OPU) and located at the Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency 
 Two managers for the operational section 
on duty  
 The head of the logistics department 
3. National 
Board of Health 
and Welfare 6 2/4 
 Director-general 
 General Manager of Administration 
 Head of Social Services Department 
 Head of Crisis Management Department 
 Two Operative Managers 
(N) informants 17 3/14
Table 1. Involved organisations, informants and their positions during the 2004 Tsunami  
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2.2. The formal structure of the Swedish rescue operation 
The political level consisted of the Ministry of Defence (heading the Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency, SRSA, and the Swedish Armed Forces), the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(heading the National Board of Health and Welfare), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Prime Minister’s Office, directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. The formal structure of 
the rescue operation is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Formal structure of the Swedish rescue operation 
This chapter focuses on leadership in the three aforementioned governmental agencies and 
their respective field teams, rather than on the political level. Each of those three 
organisations had headquarters in Sweden and the management of a rescue operation in the 
field in Thailand (see Figure 2). While a formal right of command existed within each 
organisation, there was no formal right of command for collaboration between them. The 
local operational command staff set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly acted to 
assist coordination between the broader ranges of involved organisations. Leadership 
within and between organisations occurred directly (face-to-face) and indirectly (by 
subordinate leaders/managers). 
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Figure 2. Chain of command within the organisation and leadership through collaboration between 
organisations at central and field levels 
2.3. Outline of the chapter  
This chapter deals with the organizational and individual leadership challenges identified 
during the rescue operation. Firstly, we will describe the difficulties that bureaucratic 
response organizations need to manage when a disaster such as tsunami occurs. Secondly, 
we will describe individual aspects of leadership challenges which concern stress caused by 
disaster and emotion management. A number of illustrations will highlight both aspects.  
3. Organisational leadership challenges  
3.1. Bureaucratic organizations and disaster management 
Swedish political leadership has received much criticism for its handling of Swedish citizens 
caught up in the tsunami. The main issue raised by an evaluation conducted by a 
parliamentary commission was that the Government did not have an efficient organisation 
for the management of a major disaster such as the tsunami. It was concluded that Sweden, 
in comparison to other countries, was characterised not only by the lack of an effective 
emergency organisation, but also by the lack of functional leadership at executive level 
(SOU, 2005:104).  
This problem is not unique to the Swedish Government. Emergency response organisations 
usually face the challenge of having a bureaucratic structure characterised by precision, 
discipline, reliability and predictability on the one hand (Andrzejewski, 1954), and the 
demands of meeting extreme situations where predefined directives and routines simply 
cannot cover all possibly emerging contingencies on the other (Ben Ari, 2005; Kapucu, 2006). 
The greater the uncertainty, the more difficult it is to routinize activity by preplanning 
(Morgan, 1986). The very structure of bureaucratic response organisations tends to stifle the 
creativity and flexibility required to manage large-scale disasters (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
2003). Some of the inadequacies tend to be intra-organisational. Performance may be 
confounded by a set of built-in conflicts that severely constrain policy-making, internal 
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activities and actual operations. Typical clashes are based on irrational considerations such 
as internal departmental competition, political rivalries, jealousies, and interests. These 
built-in conflicts in bureaucratic organisations hinder collaboration, coordination and 
optimal use of resources (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Drabek & McEntire, 2002).  
Rescue operations performed in foreign countries constitute a special case. In domestic 
disasters, rescue teams typically arrive at the site first and higher management staffs are 
built up successively. When a disaster takes place abroad, however, a different sequence 
typically occurs. Firstly, there has to be acceptance on a political level. Secondly, orders are 
given to the central governmental agencies, and thirdly the field teams can deploy. For this 
kind of rescue operation, which primarily aims to assist people from one’s own country 
rather than the local population, research in regard to strategic and operational leadership is 
lacking. When rescue organisations take on an assignment, they constantly deploy and 
redeploy in partly new forms that need to function each time a disaster occurs. Studying a 
special case like the Tsunami can therefore add value to the broader picture of disaster 
management, which is important since large-scale disasters today are often handled by a 
cooperation of emergency rescue units from all over the world. 
3.2. Improvisation and constraints of managing disaster 
The complexity of crisis management has been highlighted in previous research. Drabek 
(1983, 1985) showed that disaster management should be capable of responding to episodic 
and very temporary change. These kinds of episodic, extreme events create the need for 
both planned and improvised collaboration and cooperation. Mendonça and Wallace (2004) 
pointed out that insight into how organisational context may shape improvisation, 
coordination and collaborative response activities is needed both within and between 
organisations because response activities can be expected to range from planned to 
improvised. They emphasise the importance of improvisation during the response phase 
and suggest a plan that would lead to increased understanding of how improvisation as a 
response to extreme events may be observed and supported. As Kendra and Wachtendorf 
(2006, p. 29) state, “Improvisation is required to connect that which is understood 
retrospectively and that which is emerging.” Uhr et al. (2008) used social network as a 
method of analysing an emergency response system in order to identify people who served 
as links between two response organisations in the field. They observed the value of this 
function, which, in organisational theoretical terms, could be labelled ‘boundary spanners’ 
(Williams, 2002; Uhr et al., 2008). Other studies call for vertical and horizontal 
improvements in communication across various levels of government (May, 1985). McEntire 
(1998) notes that coordination will be increasingly relevant in disaster response operations 
when there have been some sort of pre-disaster ties between the agencies involved. These 
ties help generate familiarity with one another and help develop norms that emphasise 
collaboration. They generate a willingness to work with others to meet the needs of relief 
recipients and help create a network or means within which information regarding a 
disaster situation can be easily shared and quickly transmitted to others. Thus, a key to 
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effective collaboration appears to be the interaction and coordination of response 
organisations with each other before a disaster strikes (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002).  
Our study was conducted before the Swedish Governmental Official Report was released. 
We discovered that many high-level leaders in Swedish Government were on Christmas 
vacation when the tsunami struck South East Asia in 2004, and even the prime minister was 
away and had not watched the news. However, for some other organizations that are not 
normally operational during vacations, the holiday was actually advantageous as it meant 
that day-to-day work did not hinder disaster management activities (Alvinius, Danielsson & 
Larsson, 2010a).  
But it was both when the actual organisation wasn’t working, or rather, it wasn’t active 
because there were a lot of public holidays and I’d say that was perhaps an advantage 
in this context because the capacity was there for it. There weren’t that many other 
activities requiring immediate attention so we didn’t need to put anything to one side 
because we could just do that. /…/. But if it had been high season, like, with meetings 
from morning to night, the situation would have been really stressful because you 
would have been, you would have been forced to organise yourself differently.  
Nevertheless, there were many situational constraints hindering leadership performance 
and causing stress, for example, infrastructural/environmental aspects such as lack of 
resources, the impediment of routines and day-to-day activities, media as an external 
stressor, delays, time differences and understaffing.  
Asserting individual and organisational boundaries hampered successful collaboration in 
some cases. Territorial thinking came into play between authorities both during and after 
the disaster initiative and was accentuated in subsequent discussions once normalcy had 
gradually crept back into the authorities’ day-to-day activities. A shortage of computers and 
mobile phones was another obstacle to overcome. Staff in Sweden quickly made provision 
for the necessary equipment to be sent over to the field staff in Thailand, thus establishing 
communication between command centre and the field, but the geographical distance 
between the two countries meant there was a six-hour time difference. When field staff in 
Thailand needed extra resources it could mean staff back in Sweden had to work at 3 am. 
According to one informant, this time difference was seen to be an obstacle:  
So it has involved an adjustment, a time adjustment – there’s six hours difference 
between us and Thailand, which means they’re up and about over there at 3 am.  
Understaffing at Bangkok airport made it more difficult to redeem materials sent over from 
Sweden. The need for more staff at the airport was evident:  
There have been a few problems with other organisations only sending things over to a 
large airport like Bangkok, without a recipient. That makes it really difficult to find the 
stuff and you have to be careful about transport documentation and things like that, 
and communication.  
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Leadership at the highest organizational level in Sweden geared up too slowly to the 
extreme situation that prevailed following the tsunami, sending a rescue team to Thailand a 
couple of days after its occurrence. Nevertheless, when news of the disaster broke, activities 
began which could be described as expectancy-based preparations. These were partly 
performed according to general and established plans (structure), and were partly 
innovative because of the novelty of the situation (allowing freedom of action). Within 
hours, frustrations began to surface due to rigidity and lack of decision-making at 
governmental level, thus delaying the rescue operation. However, once the decision to go 
ahead with the operation had finally been made, government sentiment now swung 
towards granting a high degree of latitude in its set-up. When the field groups arrived in 
Thailand, the initially chaotic situation gradually became more ordered, and leadership at 
central level in Sweden successively became more routine-based (structure). The present 
case shows that managing contradictory needs for structure and freedom of action becomes 
easier when link functions and roles (known as boundary spanners) arise in the formal 
hierarchy during an emergency situation. 
However, there were differences in the need for structure and freedom between the two 
operational levels. For central level staff in Sweden, structure was important because their 
tasks revolved around obtaining mandates, leaders at this level thus having to wait for the 
green light from the relevant political authority in order to act. For workers in the field, the 
opposite was true, as there the task involved reacting to what had happened. In time, 
however, the needs of the field came closer to that of central level, and after a while both 
had established structures.  
 
Picture 1.  “Field level managing chaos and building gradually more ordered situation”.  
Photo: Torbjörn Olsson 
The ability to act and deal with the chaotic situation on the ground was a necessity for field 
workers in Thailand as Swedish routines did not work and situations had to be dealt with 
then and there. We illustrate:  
But with so few people you can’t sacrifice the rescue part in favour of establishing 
structure – that has to come afterwards.  
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On the one hand, a free rein was needed and a lot of the work was dealt with ad hoc. But on 
the other hand there was a need for fixed structures.  
Routines were an expression of the existence of structure and of its necessity in order for the 
authorities to act. This manifested itself as a need to follow line organisation and to stay 
within individual parameters of operation. Decisions had to come from higher authorities – 
there was a great need to have someone with the courage to ‘push the button’. For the work 
to be carried out there was also a desire to have support staff who could help with 
everything from making coffee and fetching food, to answering calls from volunteers.  
As stated, however, the desire for a free rein was just as apparent as the desire for routines. 
Making decisions was important, and it was better to make one too many than one too few, 
as illustrated by utterances such as ’no rules – do it!’, ‘make a fast decision’, informally – 
‘make it right later’, ‘no limitations’. According to one of the informants, acting without 
limitations was characteristic of workers on the ground in Thailand: 
You have to decide quickly, you have to – how should I put it… you can’t wait any longer.  
So I’d rather make one decision too many than one too few. I think it’s really important 
– especially in situations where you can’t wait and have to have the courage to make a 
decision.  
One informant in the field felt that flexibility was a desirable quality in new collaborators, as 
work structured around a checklist would be perceived as hampering an initiative. In a 
demanding situation, imagination combined with flexibility was what was necessary out in 
the field, and to achieve this, mentors were needed to teach less experienced staff to act 
accordingly. The informant maintained that checklists were not helpful:  
I’ve had dealings with a lot of young guys who are going to be commanding officers 
and they want a checklist. You’re not getting one, I say; you’ll have mentors and you’ll 
be taught this way and from experience etc – that will give you know-how.  
3.3. Boundary spanners as facilitators between leaders  
When link functions and roles arose in the formal hierarchy, the process of managing 
contradictory needs for structure and freedom of action became easier for higher levels of 
leadership. These links were individuals with specific competencies facilitating 
collaboration and communication within and between organisations. Webb (1991) refers to 
individuals with these kinds of competencies as boundary spanners. By providing linkages 
which do not exist on organisational charts, boundary spanners facilitate the sharing and 
exchange of information and link their organization with the external environment, 
especially in time of crisis (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Alvinius, Danielsson & Larsson, 2010b).  
As mentioned earlier, there is a need for improvisation in disaster management from an 
organisational and leadership perspective. Organisational management of environmental 
demands such as geographical distance, multinational collaboration with different actors 
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such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGO), building a common operating picture and 
situational awareness on site, requires management of those difficulties, sometimes at the 
same time (Alvinius, Danielsson & Larsson, 2007). One way to overcome differences 
between an organisation and its environment is to use boundary spanners. These functions 
have been shown to be essential to the efficient and effective operation of organisations by 
improving communication and collaboration between groups (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; 
Williams, 2002; Alvinius, Danielsson & Larsson, 2010b). We conclude that during the 2004 
tsunami, links or boundary spanners contributed greatly to mitigating the difficult 
circumstances encountered by the Swedish disaster initiative in terms of overcoming great 
geographical distance and delayed communication between the central and field levels, and 
in dealing with the scope of disaster and lack of disaster experience among Swedish leaders.  
Two kinds of links were identified in our study, labelled planned and spontaneous links 
respectively. These links connect organisations and individuals both vertically and 
horizontally; acting vertically between various hierarchical levels within an organisation or 
between the management of the authorities and the political level, and horizontally between 
different organisations, or between individuals at the same level within the same 
organisation/agency (see Table 2).  
 
Link
Planned Links Spontaneous Links 
Predefined position and task
a) Liaison officer 
b) Representative role  
c) Coordinator  
d) Negotiator  
e) Information officer 
f) Observer  
g) Translator (organisational differences)  
No predefined position and task 
 May belong to another organization 
 Appears on site/field 
 Coordination  
 Collaboration 
 Support 
Purposes 
 Getting the picture on site 
 Sense-making  
 Estimating the allocation of resources on 
site  
 Other competencies, such as translation 
of another language 
Aspects of trust 
Network of contacts 
Organisational acceptance, trust is related to 
a position not only to individuals 
Aspects of trust 
Swift trust  
Willingness to work across organisational 
boundaries depends on organisational 
reputation 
Negative aspect of Planned Links
Too many links mean too many different 
apprehensions  
Negative aspect of Spontaneous Links 
Running the risk of being rejected 
Table 2. Illustrates major characteristics of Planned and Spontaneous Links 
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A planned link is related to an individual’s organisational role and is most often approved 
and accepted by superiors. Planned links refer to individuals with collaboration tasks within 
their responsibility and mandate, such as liaison officers or negotiators. This linking 
function may have appeared successful in a previous event, which led to the establishment 
of this kind of link in the organisation. Planned links may be decision-makers who are able 
to act outside the framework of the organisation because he or she possesses organisational 
acceptance and has a wide experience of managing disasters or unexpected events. 
Individuals with planned link functions in crisis situations belong to the ordinary chain of 
command during ordinary day-to-day work and may have a managerial position during 
ordinary working conditions.  
Spontaneous links appear to arise when required by the extreme situation. This could 
happen when areas of responsibility, authority, competences, experiences and resources 
fail. Spontaneous links often emerge in the field and enjoy the immediate trust of people 
close by, for example planned links. They are not affiliated with an organisation but they 
are ordinary people willing to volunteer their special competencies to help during a 
rescue operation. Spontaneous links have competencies that are different to that of 
planned links and their existence is temporary. A typical spontaneous link may be a 
volunteer language translator during a disaster. To make the collaboration process 
possible, spontaneous links rapidly need to gain trust, but they also run the risk of being 
rejected if they are not part of an involved organisation. The need for spontaneous links 
disappears when the crisis is over.  
During the tsunami rescue operation a liaison officer, a planned link, was a previously 
appointed person whose job was to facilitate cooperation between organisations, to liaise 
between organisational cultures and to make collaboration more efficient, resulting in time 
savings. The Swedish Armed Forces have a built-in structure for this, which is illustrated in 
the following quote from a centrally-placed manager of the Swedish Rescue Services 
Agency: 
Initially, the Swedish Armed Forces had a liaison officer who knew the military 
language and system placed among the Rescue Services staff. I had discussions with the 
liaison officer there, and he was familiar with our stuff. 
An excerpt from the interview with the liaison officer mentioned in the above quote: 
What I’m most satisfied with is having been able to create the contacts, so the Rescue 
Services personnel and the Armed Forces personnel had a common entry point, and 
that was me. So I had a lot of discretion and saved the individual administrators a lot of 
time. 
Spontaneous links happen to be the right individuals in the right place when an unexpected 
event occurs, which is often experienced by the informants as positive. Strenuous situations 
and demands can lead to spontaneous links emerging. Actors appear when a need becomes 
visible, as was the case after the tsunami:  
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At the end of the day I got in touch with a guy who was in contact with someone down 
there (Thailand); he suddenly appeared – this Swedish Air Force officer who was there 
celebrating his 50th birthday. So he turned up and asked if they needed help with anything. 
4. Individual leadership challenges 
4.1. Stressors and stress reactions 
Individual leadership challenges varied according to whether or not the leaders were at 
home in Sweden or on the ground in Thailand. In the initial phase of the tsunami disaster, 
uncertainty among the Swedish authorities reigned and there was no understanding of 
the consequences the Southeast Asian disaster could have for Swedish society. Our 
informants exhibited stress reactions due to lack of control, for example, they found it 
difficult to predict what measures needed to be taken. The informants also testified to 
feeling powerless, for example, in the absence of written directives from higher 
authorities. Such absence of directives necessitated increased financial responsibility and 
flexibility, according to several interviewees. Alongside the other causes of stress, the 
absence of orders led to increased stress among command staff, as illustrated by the 
following comment:  
It can be stressful to make a decision to send over several million kronor’s worth of 
containers, buy air services from an aviation broker and then fly over the containers – being 
sure that in the end, it won’t be me personally paying this 10 000 000 (about one million 
Euros). 
The tsunami catastrophe took its share of Swedish victims, among them parents, leading to 
a dilemma for the National Board of Health and Welfare in terms of how to manage 
children who had been orphaned in connection with the disaster. To illustrate:  
One of the first questions raised was, what provision was there for taking care of children 
who had lost their parents – how would it be handled?… and someone got that question 
from abroad, about what guidelines the National Board of Health and Welfare had.  
Stress resulting from media pressure is described in the quote below:  
There was probably a whole bloody shed-load of them ringing, and so it started, the 
papers and press calling and they push like there’s no tomorrow.  
Typical reactions ignited by these stress factors included a sense of uncertainty about how to 
act, uncertainty as to the consequences for one’s self and others, and frustration. However, 
many of those who were involved in the disaster effort but working from their usual 
workplaces in Sweden described these stress reactions as mild:  
It’s not a big problem. You shouldn’t attach any importance to it. No! It’s not a war 
situation, there’s no stress /…/ Daylight, no-one shooting at me, the lights are on. 
Sweden’s in one piece, I go home, talk to my wife: a few odd conversations but no, not 
so very stressful.  
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Picture 2.  “Deceased Swedes prior to the first air transport back home. Staff on the ground had the job 
of collecting the deceased from refrigerated containers and placing them in coffins prior to transporting 
them home. The coffins were to be draped with the Swedish flag before departure and everything was 
to be managed with dignity, staff having discussed how to address relatives on the scene at the airport. 
The first six coffins were then transported to the Uppsala garrison for a memorial service at which the 
deceased were passed on to their families. Having to put the deceased in coffins and meet their relatives 
was an emotionally trying task for the staff.” Photo: Torbjörn Olsson 
Nevertheless, on the ground in Southeast Asia, stress reaction levels were significantly 
higher. Typical stressors for fieldworkers were their own organisation’s lack of 
understanding at central level as to the tasks they were solving, as well as deficiencies in 
their own understanding as to the role their organisation was playing and how they should 
be employed in operations. Reactions such as disappointment were a fact when central level 
conveyed criticism instead of making concrete decisions:  
They were aware that we were coming – a group like us – but they didn’t initially fully 
comprehend the capacity we had and how we were to be employed and such. 
In the field, staff was affected by physical symptoms such as sleep deficit and psychological 
conditions such as tunnel vision. In some cases, the number of tasks was perceived to be 
burdensome since they were being carried out under difficult conditions. Intense work 
shifts and sleeplessness wore out the fieldworkers, even though they were willing and 
committed to helping.  
I was working with great focus and intensity, most likely had tunnel vision to a degree, 
worked too much /…/ During those days I was working, calculated it was 96 hours /…/ 
I was most stressed by the fact that I slept too little so to speak.  
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The character and extent of the tsunami catastrophe was perceived to have caused high 
levels of stress and subsequent stress reactions. Many of the fieldworkers testify to having 
strong feelings:  
So there’s like, about 10,000 to 15,000 dead people over there and you see all the 
destruction /…/ Perhaps you can associate stress with the fact that sometimes, when 
you’ve been meeting with a lot of relatives, sometimes for a whole day, when we went 
out with them and stuff so you got so close to them. You got told so much that you got 
really affected, you know. We cried several times. We could have parting ceremonies 
with coffins and flags; we could have four to five a week.  
 
Picture 3. Collection point for the dead in Ban Muang. Staffs were confronted with an unfathomable 
number of dead people there and it was difficult to take in. At the same time, conditions were  
static – the people were already dead. The task now was to identify them as carefully and as sensitively 
as possible. Not much more could be done than to play one’s part as well as possible.  
Photo: Torbjörn Olsson 
As previously mentioned, field workers were committed and willing. They wanted to do a 
good job and be professional but stretched themselves in the process: 
The commitment was there, and the willingness was there in the whole team to do a 
professional job and do it well. So I think that was different from the others back in 
Sweden but on the other hand we really stretched ourselves.  
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In summary (see Table 3), the factors that triggered stress reactions at central levels of 
authority in Sweden were a lack of directives, the need to make serious decisions without 
formal mandates, pressure from the media, and new, unexpected questions and demands 
from one’s own organisation. Factors triggering stress in the field were associated more with 
central level’s lack of understanding for or knowledge of what fieldworkers were doing there 
and of the competence they possessed, the intense work pace and length of the working day, 
and the experience of encountering relatives and the deceased at parting ceremonies.  
Table 3. Stress and stress reactions among leaders at the central level in Sweden and the field level in 
Thailand  
4.2. Emotional management  
Stressful events like the tsunami impact greatly on both individuals and organisations. 
Crisis management organisations should be able to adapt rapidly to the pressures 
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reactions and  
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management  
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Emotional management 
 
Central level in 
Sweden 
 
 Lack of control 
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emanating from the surrounding environment, i.e. the world outside the parameters of the 
organisation. Society puts demands on authorities to manage crises that arise, and these 
demands can trigger emotional processes on an individual, group and organisational basis. 
Such demands are often about mobilising the right resources in relation to the occurred 
event, and it is in this context that one often talks about incremental stress and tension 
(Alvinius, Danielsson & Larsson, 2010a).  
Recently, researchers have become increasingly interested in examining the subject of 
emotions in day to day activities, but also in stressful, life and death situations (Alvinius, 
Kylin, Starrin & Larsson, 2011). From a societal perspective, there are emotional cultures 
which must be followed, involving compliance with other people’s expectations of 
emotional expression. To meet these expectations, the individual must subscribe to a certain 
amount of emotion management. One likely significant aspect of the work carried out by 
operations staff during the tsunami catastrophe was the management of their own as well as 
others’ emotional reactions. Related research from sociology has elicited the concept of 
‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 2003), in which the conclusion is made that service 
professions (as opposed to manufacturing ones) are subject to the demands of prescribed 
emotional expression, which more or less requires individuals to modify their own natural 
feelings. They are expected to outwardly exhibit a certain ‘face’: a composite of a particular 
vocabulary, tone, body language, dress etc.  
Some examples of emotion management during the tsunami rescue operation are mentioned 
in the following. Each decision-maker and collaborator serving during the tsunami disaster 
brought their own experiences and contacts to operations. Previous experience was in their 
bones, allowing them to act directly. Other informants made mention of their own special 
experiences, for example, from Africa, where they were used to international aid initiatives, 
medical care and working under time-critical conditions. This type of experience was an asset 
to those going on to manage their own emotions during the tsunami disaster rescue operation. 
Thus, previous experience of managing international crises was also an asset to individuals 
and organisations, as testified to below:  
I think a lot of this commitment exists in the Civil Contingencies Agency – has done 
historically, so to speak /…/ because we’ve carried out international aid operations.  
However, the experiences from the tsunami disaster were, according to our informants, of a 
completely new kind and described as once-in-a-lifetime occurrence; they had never before 
encountered this kind of catastrophe in their careers. The fact that so many of the afflicted 
were Swedes and spoke their native language brought the field workers closer to the victims 
and more involved in their destinies. Managing the tsunami catastrophe required dealing 
with a number of emotions such as grief, sadness, anger, joy and pride. Familiarity with 
individuals and personal networks readily facilitated this emotion management. More 
generally, it was found that effective leadership was related to effective emotion 
management. This, in turn, was related to cultural awareness in addition to effective 
personal emotion-focused coping techniques.  
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5. Conclusions 
The act of maintaining balance between authority and structure on one hand and allowing 
freedom of initiative on the other was found to be the most significant aspect of leadership 
during the tsunami rescue operation. Thus it can be concluded that operational managers at 
faraway disaster sites should be prepared to act independently without higher command. 
When there is distance and information asymmetry between central strategic leadership and 
the field, operational commanders need to operate autonomously in order to be effective. 
The functional aspect of putting the formal chain of command aside and taking personal 
initiative at lower levels also has theoretical implications. According to most organisational 
theories (e.g. Cameron et al., 1987), top management tends to take a firmer grip in tough 
times. Decision-making responsibility is passed upwards, participation decreases and 
control is emphasised. The present study, just like a military study (Larsson et al., 2007), 
shows cases where the opposite was functional. We think this is of value in highlighting the 
importance of flexibility and freedom of decision-making at the initial stage of any disaster, 
at which point decentralisation should be encouraged.  
A second major finding is the identification of planned and spontaneous links, and the 
different positions that these links can take. They contribute in diverse ways to effective 
operation by enabling exchange between individuals and groups. When functioning at their 
best, these links provide the rigid structure of bureaucratically organised emergency 
response agencies, with the creativity and flexibility required. In short, the two kinds of 
links contribute to organisational adaptation to environmental conditions. We propose and 
encourage openness towards spontaneous links and paying increased attention to trust, for 
instance in selection and organisation development processes. The following specific 
implication is also suggested: educate organisational gate keepers and boundary spanners 
acting as planned links in order to avoid an over-emphasis on control-driven compliance. 
This is a long-term endeavour and points to the importance of organisational climate.  
The third major finding is the demonstration of the importance of a so far underestimated 
operational skill, the ability to manage one’s own and others’ emotions. Our study shows 
that leaders utilise various ways of emotional management in order to fulfil the demands 
partly laid upon them by the disaster environment and partly by their own bureaucratic 
organisation. The extreme demands of a disaster rescue operation highlight the need to look 
beyond the purely rationalistic perspective of emergency response organizations. 
Operational effectiveness is also dependent on the quality of the key actors’ emotional 
labour and emotions-focused coping skills capacity.  
Leadership challenges 
at central level in Sweden 
Leadership challenges 
at field level in Thailand 
Need for structure Need for freedom of action 
Planned Links facilitate collaboration Planned Links facilitate collaboration 
Spontaneous Links are recognised 
Manage one’s own emotions Manage one’s own and others’ emotions 
Table 4. Illustrates main conclusions 
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The generalizability of the three presented conclusions is, strictly speaking, an empirical 
question. Thus, we encourage research colleagues to consider and evaluate them in future 
disaster studies. 
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